Grace and Free-Will — Section 2: Theological Systems, Article 1: Thomism and Augustinianism

SECTION 2: THEOLOGICAL SYSTEMS DEVISED TO HARMONIZE THE DOGMAS OF GRACE AND FREE-WILL

The relation of grace to free-will may be regarded from a twofold point of view. We may take grace as the primary factor and trace it in its action on the human will; or, starting from the latter, we may endeavor to ascertain how free-will is affected by grace.

The first-mentioned method has given birth to two closely related theological systems, Thomism and Augustinianism; the latter to Molinism and Congruism, which are almost identical in substance.

Besides these there is a fifth theory, which tries to reconcile the two extremes and may therefore be called eclectic.

That the human will is free, yet subject to the influence of grace, is an article of faith unhesitatingly accepted by all Catholic theologians. It is in trying to explain how grace and free-will coöperate, that the above-mentioned schools differ.

In approaching this extremely difficult and obscure problem we consider it our duty to warn the student against preconceived opinions and to remind him that the different systems which we are about to examine are all tolerated by the Church. To-day, when so many more important things are at stake and the faith is viciously assailed from without, the ancient controversy between Thomism and Molinism had better be left in abeyance.

ARTICLE 1: THOMISM AND AUGUSTINIANISM

Thomism and Augustinianism both hinge on the concept of gratia efficax ab intrinseco s. per se, whereas Molinism and Congruism will not admit even the existence of such a grace.

1. The Thomistic Theory of Grace

The true founder of the Thomistic system is not St. Thomas Aquinas, who is also claimed by the Molinists, but the learned Dominican theologian Bañez (1528-1604). His teaching may be summarized as follows:

a) God is the First Cause (causa prima) and Prime Mover (motor primus) of all things, and all created or secondary causes (causae secundae) derive their being and faculties, nay, their very acts from Him. If any creature could act independently of God, God would cease to be causa prima and motor primus.¹

The influence of the First Cause is universal, that is to say, it produces all creatural acts without exception, — necessary and free, good and bad, — because no secondary cause has power to act unless it is set in motion by the motor primus.

In influencing His creatures, however, God adapts himself to the peculiar nature of each. The necessary causes He determines to act necessarily, the free causes, freely. All receive from Him their substance and their mode of action.² The rational creature, therefore, though subject to His determining influence, acts with perfect freedom, just as if it were not moved.

b) In spite of free-will, however, the influence which God exerts on His rational creatures is irresistible because it proceeds from an absolute and omnipotent Being whose decrees brook no opposition. What God wills infallibly happens.³

Nevertheless, God is not the author of sin. He moves the sinner to perform an act; but He does not move him to perform a sinful act. The malice of sin derives solely from the free will of man.⁴

c) Since the divine influence causally precedes all creatural acts, God’s concurrence with creatural causes (concursus generalis) must be conceived as prevenient, not simultaneous. The Divine Omnipotence not only makes the action possible, but likewise effects it by moving the will from potentiality to actuality.⁵ Consequently, the causal influence which the Creator exerts upon His creatures is not a mere motio, but a praemotio, — and not merely moral, but physical (praemotio physica).⁶ It is by physical premotion that God’s prevenient influence effects the free actions of His creatures, without regard to their assent.⁷ Free-will is predetermined by God before it determines itself.⁸

d) If we analyse God’s physical predeterminations in so far as they are created entities, we find that they are nothing else than the effect and execution of His eternal decrees, embodied in the praedeterminatio physica. It is the temporal execution of the latter that is called praemotio physica. Hence we are justified in speaking, not only of a temporal praemotio, but of an eternal praedeterminatio, in fact the terms are often used synonymously.⁹

Viewed in its relation to rational creatures, this eternal predetermination is nothing but a temporal premotion of the free will to determine itself. Since God has from all eternity made absolute and conditional decrees, which possess the power of physical predetermination without regard to the free consent of His creatures, physical predetermination constitutes an infallible medium by which He can foreknow their future free actions, and hence there is no need of a scientia media. If God knows His own will, He must also know the free determinations included therein. To deny this would be to destroy the very foundation of His foreknowledge.¹⁰

This is merely the philosophical basis of the Thomistic system. Its champions carry the argument into the theological domain by reasoning as follows: What is true in the natural must be equally true in the supernatural sphere, as we know from reason and Revelation.¹¹

e) To physical predetermination or premotion in the order of nature, there corresponds in the supernatural sphere the gratia efficax, which predetermines man to perform salutary acts in such wise that he acts freely but at the same time with metaphysical necessity (necessitate consequentiae, not consequentis). It would be a contradiction to say that efficacious grace given for the purpose of eliciting consent may co-exist with non-consent, i. e., may fail to elicit consent.¹² The will freely assents to the divine impulse because it is effectively moved thereto by grace. Consequently, efficacious grace does not derive its efficacy from the consent of the will; it is efficacious of itself and intrinsically (gratia efficax ab intrinseco sive per se).¹³

It follows that efficacious grace must be conceived as a praedeterminatio ad unum.¹⁴

f) If efficacious grace is intrinsically and of its very nature inseparably bound up with the consent of the will, it must differ essentially from merely sufficient grace (gratia mere sufficiens), which confers only the power to act (posse operari), not the act itself (actu operari). Efficacious grace, by its very definition, includes the free consent of the will, while merely sufficient grace lacks that consent, because with it, it would cease to be merely sufficient and would become efficacious.¹⁵

Here the question naturally arises: How, in this hypothesis, can sufficient grace be called truly sufficient? The Thomists answer this question in different ways. Gazzaniga says that sufficient grace confers the power to perform a good deed, but that something more is required for the deed itself.¹⁶ De Lemos ascribes the inefficacy of merely sufficient grace to a defect of the will.¹⁷ If the will did not resist, God would promptly add efficacious grace.¹⁸

Critical Estimate of the Thomistic Theory

The Thomistic system undoubtedly has its merits. It is logical in its deductions, exalts divine grace as the prime factor in the business of salvation, and magnificently works out the concept of God as causa prima and motor primus both in the natural and the supernatural order.

But Thomism also has its weak points.

A. Theological Difficulties

The Thomistic conception of efficacious grace is open to two serious theological difficulties.

(1) To draw an intrinsic and substantial distinction between efficacious and merely sufficient grace destroys the true notion of sufficient grace.

(2) The Thomistic theory of efficacious grace is incompatible with the dogma of free-will.

Though in theory the Thomists defend the sufficiency of grace and the freedom of the will as valiantly as their opponents, they fail in their attempts at squaring these dogmas with the fundamental principles of their system.

a) Sufficient grace, as conceived by the Thomists, is not truly sufficient to enable a man to perform a salutary act, because ex vi notionis it confers merely the power to act, postulating for the act itself a substantially new grace (gratia efficax). A grace which requires to be entitatively supplemented by another, in order to enable a man to perform a salutary act, is clearly not sufficient for the performance of that act. “To be truly sufficient for something” and “to require to be complemented by something else” are mutually exclusive notions, and hence “sufficient grace” as conceived by Thomists is in reality insufficient.

Many subtle explanations have been devised to obviate this difficulty. Billuart and nearly all the later Thomists say that if any one who has received sufficient grace (in the Thomistic sense of the term) is denied the gratia efficax, it must be attributed to a sinful resistance of the will.¹⁹ But this explanation is incompatible with the Thomistic teaching that together with the gratia sufficiens there co-exists in the soul of the sinner an irresistible and inevitable praemotio physica to the entity of sin, with which entity formal sin is inseparably bound up.²⁰ If this be true, how can the will of man be held responsible so long as God denies him the gratia ab intrinseco efficax?

Speaking in the abstract, the will may assume one of three distinct attitudes toward sufficient grace. It may consent, it may resist, or it may remain neutral. It cannot consent except with the aid of a predetermining gratia efficax, to merit which is beyond its power. If it withstands, it eo ipso renders itself unworthy of the gratia efficax. If it takes a neutral attitude, (which may in itself be a sinful act), and awaits efficacious grace, of what use is sufficient grace?

To resist sufficient grace involves an abuse of liberty. Now, where does the right use of liberty come in? If coöperation with sufficient grace moves God to bestow the gratia per se efficax, as the Thomists contend, then the right use of liberty must lie somewhere between the gratia sufficiens and the gratia efficax per se. But there is absolutely no place for it in the Thomistic system. The right use of liberty for the purpose of obtaining efficacious grace is attributable either to grace or to unaided nature. To assert that it is the work of unaided nature would lead to Semipelagianism. To hold that it is owing to grace would be moving in a vicious circle, thus: “Because the will offers no resistance, it is efficaciously moved to perform a salutary act; that it offers no sinful resistance is owing to the fact that it is efficaciously moved to perform a salutary act.”²¹

It is impossible to devise any satisfactory solution of this difficulty which will not at the same time upset the very foundation on which the Thomistic system rests, viz.: “Nulla secunda causa potest operari, nisi sit efficaciter determinata a prima [scil. per applicationem potentiae ad actum],” that is to say, no secondary cause can act unless it be efficaciously determined by the First Cause by an application of the latter to the former as of potency to act.

b) The Thomistic gratia efficax, conceived as a praedeterminatio ad unum, inevitably destroys free-will.

α) It is important to state the question clearly: Not physical premotion as such,²² but the implied connotation of praevia determinatio ad unum, is incompatible with the dogma of free-will. The freedom of the will does not consist in the pure contingency of an act, or in a merely passive indifference, but in active indifference either to will or not to will, to will thus or otherwise. Consequently every physical predetermination, in so far as it is a determinatio ad unum, must necessarily be destructive of free-will. Self-determination and physical predetermination by an extraneous will are mutually exclusive. Now the Thomists hold that the gratia per se efficax operates in the manner of a supernatural praedeterminatio ad unum. If this were true, the will under the influence of efficacious grace would no longer be free.

To perceive the full force of this argument it is necessary to keep in mind the Thomistic definition of praemotio physica as “actio Dei, quâ voluntatem humanam, priusquam se determinet, ita ad actum movet insuperabili virtute, ut voluntas nequeat omissionem sui actus cum illa praemotione coniungere.”²³ That is to say: As the non-performance of an act by the will is owing simply and solely to the absence of the respective praemotio physica, so conversely, the performance of an act is conditioned simply and solely by the presence of a divine premotion; the will itself can neither obtain nor prevent such a premotion, because this would require a new premotion, which again depends entirely on the divine pleasure. If the will of man were thus inevitably predetermined by God, it could not in any sense of the term be called truly free.

β) The Thomists meet this argument with mere evasions. They make a distinction between necessitas consequentis (antecedens), which really necessitates, and necessitas consequentiae (subsequens), which does not. A free act, they say, necessarily proceeds from a physical premotion, but it is not on that account in itself necessary. But, we answer, a determinatio ad unum, which precedes a free act and is independent of the will, is more than a necessitas consequentiae — it is a necessitas consequentis destructive of free-will. The Thomists reply: Considered as a created entity, physical premotion may indeed be incompatible with free-will; not so if regarded as an act of God, who, being almighty, is able to predetermine the will without prejudice to its freedom.²⁴ The obvious rejoinder is that an intrinsic contradiction cannot be solved by an appeal to the divine omnipotence, because even God Himself cannot do what is intrinsically impossible.²⁵ He can no more change a determinatio ad unum into a libertas ad utrumque than He can create a square circle, because the two notions involve an intrinsic contradiction. Furthermore, if the Almighty wished intrinsically to compel a man to perform some definite act, would He not choose precisely that praemotio physica which, the Thomists claim, also produces free acts? Not so, replies Alvarez; “for the will remains free so long as the intellect represents to it an object as indifferent.”²⁶ That is to say: Liberty remains as long as its root, i. e. an indifferent judgment, is present. But this new rejoinder, far from solving the riddle, simply begs the question. Liberty of choice resides formaliter in the will, not in the intellect, and consequently the will, as will, cannot be truly free unless it possesses within itself the unimpeded power to act or not to act. This indifferentia activa ad utrumlibet, as it is technically termed, is absolutely incompatible with the Thomistic praemotio ad unum. What would it avail the will to enjoy the indifferentia iudicii if it had to submit to compulsion from some other quarter?

γ) To escape from this quandary the Thomists resort to the famous distinction between the sensus compositus and the sensus divisus. The Molinists argue: “Liberum arbitrium efficaciter praemotum a gratia non potest dissentire; ergo non est liberum.” The Thomists reply: “Distinguo: — non potest dissentire in sensu diviso, nego; non potest dissentire in sensu composito, concedo.” They explain this distinction by certain well-known examples taken from dialectics. Thus Billuart says: “Ut si dicas, sedens potest stare, significat in sensu composito, quod possit sedere simul et stare; … in sensu diviso, quod sedens sub sessione retinet potentiam standi, non tamen componendi stationem cum sessione. Uno verbo: sensus compositus importat potentiam simultaneitatis, sensus divisus simultaneitatem potentiae.”²⁷ As one who sits cannot at the same time stand (sensus compositus), although he is free to rise (sensus divisus), so the consent of the will effected by efficacious grace, cannot become dissent (sensus compositus), though the will retains the power to dissent instead of consenting (sensus divisus), and this is sufficient to safeguard its freedom.

Is the distinction between sensus compositus and sensus divisus correctly applied here? Can the will, under the predetermining influence of the gratia efficax, change its consent into dissent at any time and as easily as a man who is sitting on a chair can rise and thereby demonstrate that his sitting was an absolutely free act? Alvarez²⁸ describes the Thomistic potentia dissentiendi as a faculty which can never under any circumstances become active. But such a potentia is really no potentia at all. A man tied to a chair is not free to stand; his natural potentia standi is neutralized by external restraint. Similarly, the will, under the influence of the Thomistic gratia efficax, no longer enjoys the power to dissent, and the alleged potentia resistendi, by which the Thomists claim to save free-will, is a chimera.

δ) It is at this decisive point in the controversy that the Molinists triumphantly bring in the declaration of the Council of Trent that “man … while he receives that inspiration [i. e. efficacious grace], … is also able to reject it.” And again: “If any one saith that man’s free-will, moved and excited by God, by assenting to God exciting and calling, does in no wise coöperate towards disposing and preparing itself for obtaining the grace of justification; that it cannot refuse its consent if it would, but that, as something inanimate, it does nothing whatever and is merely passive; let him be anathema.”²⁹ To adjust their system to this important dogmatic decision, the older Thomists claimed that the Tridentine Council had in mind merely the gratia sufficiens, to which the will can refuse its consent. But this interpretation is untenable. The Council plainly refers to that grace with which the will coöperates by giving its consent (cooperatur assentiendo) and which it can render inefficacious by withdrawing its consent, in other words, with the grace which disposes and prepares a sinner for justification, and under the influence of which, according to Luther and Calvin, the will remains inanimate and merely passive. This can only be the gratia efficax. Other Thomist theologians, not daring to contradict the obvious sense of the Tridentine decree, assert that the Council intentionally chose the term dissentire (sensus divisus) rather than resistere (sensus compositus), in order to indicate that under the predetermining influence of grace it is possible for the will to refuse its consent (posse dissentire) but not to offer resistance (posse resistere).³⁰ This interpretation is no longer tenable since the Vatican Council has defined that “Faith, even when it does not work by charity, is in itself a gift of God, and the act of faith is a work appertaining to salvation, by which man yields voluntary obedience to God Himself, by assenting to and coöperating with His grace, which he is able to resist.”³¹ If efficacious grace can be successfully resisted, it can not possess that “irresistible” influence which the Thomists ascribe to it.³²

B. Philosophical Difficulties

The Thomistic system is open to two serious objections also from the philosophical point of view. One of these concerns the medium by which God foreknows the future free acts of His rational creatures; the other, His relation to sin.

a) In regard to the first-mentioned point we do not, of course, underestimate the immense difficulties involved in the problem of God’s foreknowledge of the free acts of the future.

The Molinistic theory also has its difficulties, and they are so numerous and weighty that in our treatise on God³³ we made no attempt to demonstrate the scientia media by stringent arguments, but merely accepted it as a working hypothesis which supplies some sort of scientific basis for the dogmas of divine omnipotence and free-will in both the natural and the supernatural order.

b) A more serious objection than the one just adverted to is that the Thomistic hypothesis involves the blasphemous inference that God predetermines men to sin.

α) Under a rigorous application of the Thomistic principles God would have to be acknowledged as the cause of sin. As the predetermination of the will to justification can take no other form than the gratia per se efficax, so sin, considered as an act, necessarily postulates the predetermining influence of the motor primus.³⁴ Without this assumption it would be impossible in the Thomistic system to find in the absolute will of God an infallible medium by which He can foreknow future sins. Bañez says on this point: “God knows sin with an intuitive knowledge, because His will is the cause of the sinful act, as act, at the same time permitting free-will to concur in that act by failing to observe the law.”³⁵ Though the Thomists refuse to admit that God Himself is the immediate author of sin, the conclusion is inevitable from their premises. And this for two reasons. First, because the alleged praemotio ad malum is as irresistible as the praemotio ad bonum; and secondly, because the material element of sin must be inseparable from its formal element; otherwise God would foreknow sin merely materialiter as an act but not formaliter as a sin. The teaching of the Church on this point was clearly defined by the Council of Trent: “If any one saith that it is not in man’s power to make his ways evil, but that the works that are evil God worketh as well as those that are good, not permissibly only, but properly and of Himself, in such wise that the treason of Judas is no less His own proper work than the vocation of Paul; let him be anathema.”³⁶

If the rational creature were compelled to perform a sinful act, as act, resistance would be impossible. And if it were true that the malice of an act practically cannot be separated from its physical entity, then in the Thomistic hypothesis God would be the author not only of the entitas but likewise of the malitia peccati. The devil tempts us only by moral means, i. e. by suggestion; are we to assume that God tempts us physically by inducing sin as an act and simultaneously withholding the praemotio ad bonum, thus making sin an inevitable fatality? This consideration may be supplemented by another. So-called “sins of malice” are comparatively rare. Most sins are committed for the sake of some pleasure or imaginary advantage. It is for this reason that moral theology in forbidding sin forbids its physical entity. How gladly would not those who are addicted to impurity, for instance, separate the malice from the entity of their sinful acts, in order to be enabled to indulge their passion without offending God!

β) Against the logic of this argument some Thomist theologians defend themselves by a simile. The soul of a lame man, they say, enables him indeed to move his disabled limb; however, the cause of limping is not the soul but a crooked shinbone. Father Pesch wittily disposes of such reasoning as follows: “The will of Adam before the fall was not a crooked shinbone, but it was absolutely straight, and became crooked through physical premotion.”³⁷

Another and more plausible contention of the Thomist school is that Molinism, too, is compelled to ascribe sin somehow to God. “It is impossible for a man to sin unless God lends His coöperation. Do not, therefore, the Molinists also make God the author of sin?” Those who argue in this wise overlook the fact that there is a very large distinction between the concursus simultaneus of the Molinists and the praemotio physica of the Thomists. The praemotio physica predetermines the sinful act without regard to the circumstance whether or not the will is able to offer resistance. The concursus simultaneus, on the other hand, begins as a mere concursus oblatus, which is in itself indifferent and awaits as it were the free consent of the will before it coöperates with the sinner as concursus collatus in the performance of the sinful act.³⁸ For this reason the distinction between actus and malitia has a well-defined place in the Molinistic system, whereas it is meaningless in that of the Thomists.³⁹

2. Augustinianism

This system, so called because its defenders pretend to base it on the authority of St. Augustine, has some points of similarity with Thomism but differs from the latter in more than one respect, especially in this that the Augustinians,⁴⁰ though they speak with great deference of the gratia per se efficax, hold that the will is not physically but only morally predetermined in its free acts. Hence Augustinianism may fitly be described as the system of the praedeterminatio moralis. Its most eminent defender is Lawrence Berti, O. S. A. (1696-1766), who in a voluminous work De Theologicis Disciplinis⁴¹ so vigorously championed the Augustinian theory that Archbishop Jean d’Yse de Saléon, of Vienne,⁴² and other contemporary theologians combated his teaching as a revival of Jansenism. Pope Benedict XIV instituted an official investigation, which resulted in a decree permitting Augustinianism to be freely held and taught.

a) Whereas Thomism begins with the concept of causa prima and motor primus, Augustinianism is based on the notion of delectatio coelestis or caritas. Berti holds three principles in common with Jansenius: (1) Actual grace consists essentially in the infusion of celestial delectation. (2) This heavenly delectation (i. e. grace) causally precedes free-will in such wise that its relative intensity in every instance constitutes the law and standard of the will’s disposition to do good. (3) Simultaneously with this celestial delectation, concupiscence (delectatio carnalis, concupiscentia) is doing its work in fallen man, and the two powers constantly contend for the mastery. So long as celestial delectation (i. e. grace) is weaker than, or equipollent with, concupiscence, the will inevitably fails to perform the salutary act to which it is invited by the former. It is only when the delectatio coelestis overcomes concupiscence (delectatio coelestis victrix) that free-will can perform the act inspired by grace. There is a fourth principle, and one, too, of fundamental importance, which brings out the essential difference between Augustinianism and Jansenism, viz.: the delectatio coelestis never overpowers the will but leaves it free to choose between good and evil.⁴³

b) The relation between merely sufficient and efficacious grace in the Augustinian system, therefore, may be described as follows: Merely sufficient grace imparts to the will the posse but not the velle, or at best only such a weak velle that it requires the delectatio victrix (gratia efficax) to become effective. Efficacious grace (delectatio coelestis victrix), on the other hand, impels the will actually to perform the good deed. Hence there is between the two an essential and specific difference, and the efficacy of that grace which leads to the performance of salutary acts does not lie with free-will but depends on the delectatio coelestis, which must consequently be conceived as gratia efficax ab intrinseco sive per se.⁴⁴

c) Nevertheless, the necessity of the gratia efficax ab intrinseco, according to the Augustinian theory, is not due to the subordination of the causa secunda to the causa prima, as the Thomists contend, but to a constitutional weakness of human nature, consisting in this that its evil impulses can be overcome solely by the delectatio coelestis victrix (gratia efficax, adiutorium quo). The case was different before the Fall, when the gratia versatilis (gratia sufficiens, adiutorium sine quo non) sufficed for the performance of salutary acts.⁴⁵

d) However, the Augustinians insist against the Jansenists, that the delectatio coelestis (i. e. efficacious grace) does not intrinsically compel the will, but acts merely as a praemotio moralis, and that while the will obeys the inspiration of grace infallibly (infallibiliter) it does not do so necessarily (non necessario). With equal certainty, though not necessarily, the will, when equipped solely with sufficient grace, succumbs to concupiscence. The ultimate reason for the freedom of the will is to be found in the indifferentia iudicii.⁴⁶ By way of exemplification the Augustinians cite the case of a well-bred man who, though physically free and able to do so, would never turn summersaults on a public thoroughfare or gouge out his own eyes.

Critical Estimate of Augustinianism

On account of its uncritical methods Augustinianism has found but few defenders and deserves notice only in so far as it claims to base its teaching on St. Augustine.

Like the Bible, the writings of that holy Doctor have been quoted in support of many contradictory systems.⁴⁷ If the use of Augustinian terms guaranteed the possession of Augustinian ideas, Jansenius would have a strong claim to be considered a faithful disciple of St. Augustine. Yet how widely does not the “Augustinus Iprensis,” as he has been called, differ from the “Augustinus Hipponensis”! Augustinianism, too, utterly misconceives the terms which it employs. Space permits us to call attention to one or two points only.

a) In the first place Augustinianism labors under an absolutely false conception of sufficient grace.

How can that grace be sufficient for justification which is first described in glowing colors as parva et invalida and then in the same breath is declared to be insufficient except when reinforced by a gratia magna in the shape of delectatio victrix? What kind of “grace” can that be which in its very nature is so constituted that the will, under the prevailing influence of concupiscence, infallibly does the opposite of that to which it is supernaturally impelled? It is quite true that the distinction between gratia parva and gratia magna⁴⁸ is found in St. Augustine. However, he understands by gratia parva not sufficient grace, but the grace of prayer (gratia remote sufficiens), and by gratia magna, not efficacious grace as such, but grace sufficient to perform a good act (gratia proxime sufficiens).⁴⁹

b) Augustinianism is unable to reconcile its theory of a praemotio moralis with the dogma of free-will.

Under the Augustinian system the influence of efficacious grace can be conceived in but two ways. Either it is so strong that the will is physically unable to withhold its consent; or it is only strong enough that the consent of the will can be inferred with purely moral certainty. In the former alternative we have a prevenient necessity which determines the will ad unum and consequently destroys its freedom. In the latter, there can be no infallible foreknowledge of the future free acts of rational creatures on the part of God, because the Augustinians reject the scientia media of the Molinists and expressly admit that the same grace which proves effective in one man remains ineffective in another because of the condition of his heart.⁵⁰

c) Finally, the three fundamental principles of the Augustinian system are false and have no warrant in the writings of St. Augustine.

It is not true that pleasure (delectatio) is the font and well-spring of all supernaturally good deeds. Such deeds may also be inspired by hatred, fear, sorrow, etc.⁵¹ With many men the fear of God or a sense of duty is as strong an incentive to do good as the sweet consciousness of treading the right path. St. Augustine did not regard “celestial delectation” as the essential mark of efficacious grace, nor concupiscence as the characteristic note of sin.⁵²

The second and third principles of the Augustinian system are likewise false. If delectation is only one motive among many, its varying intensity cannot be the standard of our conduct; and still less can it be said that the will is morally compelled in each instance to obey the relatively stronger as against the weaker delectation; for any necessitation that does not depend on the free will excludes the libertas a coactione, but not that libertas a necessitate which constitutes the notion of liberty. There can be no freedom of the will unless the will is able to resist delectation at all times. Consequently, the fourth principle of the Augustinians, by which they pretend to uphold free-will, is also false.⁵³

READINGS: — The literature on the different systems of grace is enormous. We can mention only a few of the leading works.

On the Thomist side: *Bañez, O. P., Comment. in S. Theol. S. Thom., Salamanca 1584 sqq. — *Alvarez, O. P., De Auxiliis Gratiae et Humani Arbitrii Viribus, Rome 1610. — Idem, Responsionum Libri Quatuor, Louvain 1622. — Ledesma, O. P., De Divinae Gratiae Auxiliis, Salamanca 1611. — *Gonet, O. P., Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae, 16 vols., Bordeaux 1659-69. — Contenson, O. P., Theologia Mentis et Cordis, Lyons 1673. — De Lemos, O. P., Panoplia Divinae Gratiae, 4 vols., Liège 1676. — Goudin, O. P., De Scientia et Voluntate Dei, new ed., Louvain 1874. — *Gotti, O. P., Theologia Scholastico-Dogmatica iuxta Mentem Divi Thomae, Venice 1750. — Gazzaniga, O. P., Theologia Dogmatica in Systema Redacta, 2 vols., Vienne 1776. — *Billuart, De Gratia, diss. 5 (ed. Lequette, t. III, pp. 123 sqq.). — Idem, Le Thomisme Triomphant, Paris 1725. — *Fr. G. Feldner, O. P., Die Lehre des hl. Thomas über die Willensfreiheit der vernünftigen Wesen, Prague 1890. — Idem, in Commer’s Jahrbuch für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, 1894 sqq. — *Dummermuth, O. P., S. Thomas et Doctrina Praemotionis Physicae, Paris 1886. — I. A. Manser, Possibilitas Praemotionis Physicae Thomisticae in Actibus Liberis, Fribourg (Switzerland) 1895. — Joh. Ude, Doctrina Capreoli de Influxu Dei in Actus Voluntatis Humanae, Graz 1905. — Del Prado, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, 3 vols., Fribourg (Switzerland) 1907.

On the Augustinian side: Card. Norisius, Vindiciae Augustinianae, Padua 1677. — *Berti, De Theologicis Disciplinis, 8 vols., Rome 1739 sqq. — Bellelli, Mens Augustini de Modo Reparationis Humanae Naturae, 2 vols., Rome 1773. — L. de Thomassin, Mémoires sur la Grâce, etc., Louvain 1668.

For a list of Molinistic and Congruistic authors see pp. 269 sq.

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Footnotes

1. Cfr. Bañez, Comment. in S. Theol., 1 p., qu. 14, art. 13: “Nulla secunda causa potest operari, nisi sit efficaciter determinata a prima.” ↩

2. Cfr. Billuart, De Deo, diss. 8, art. 4: “Movet nempe Deus non solum ad substantiam actus, sed etiam ad modum eius, qui est libertas.” ↩

3. Cfr. Alvarez, De Auxiliis, disp. 83, n. 9: “Quando agens infinitae virtutis movet aliquod subiectum, tale subiectum infallibiliter movetur, quia tunc resistentia passi non superat nec adaequat virtutem agentis. Sed Deus est agens infinitae virtutis. Ergo motio Dei efficax respectu cuiuscumque hominis in quibuslibet circumstantiis positi erit medium congruum et aptum, ut infallibiliter inducat effectum, ad quem ex Dei intentione datur.” ↩

4. Cfr. Billuart, De Deo, diss. 8, art. 5: “Restat ergo tertia sententia, scilicet Deum praemovere physice ad entitatem peccati et sic se effecturum definivisse decreto positivo et effectivo; operatur enim omnia secundum consilium voluntatis suae.” ↩

5. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, pp. 73 sqq. ↩

6. Cfr. De Lemos, Acta Congr. de Aux., p. 1065: “Illa praepositio ‘prae’ nihil aliud denotat aut denotare potest quam Deum esse priorem et primam causam, prius naturâ et causalitate moventem, applicantem, inclinantem et determinantem voluntatem, quam ipsa voluntas se determinet.” ↩

7. Cfr. Gonet, Clypeus Theol. Thomist., disp. 11, art. 5: “Haec divina motio in creatura recepta a Thomistis ‘physica’ appelatur, … quia ex propria essentia et ab intrinseco est efficax, independenter a quocumque creato consensu.” ↩

8. Cfr. Graveson, Epist. Theol. Polem., t. I, ep. 11: “Voluntas creata priusquam se determinet, a Deo debet determinari, quia scil. indifferens sit eaque indifferentia non solvatur quam per praeviam Dei motionem.” Cfr. Alvarez, De Auxiliis, disp. 28: “Liberum arbitrium, quia creatum est, licet determinet sibi actum, illum tamen determinat praedeterminatum a Deo.” ↩

9. Cfr. Reginald., De Novit. Antiquit. Nominis Praedeterm. Phys., l. II, c. 36: “Quum Deus hanc motionem det causis sciens et volens atque adeo cum [aeternâ] cognitione et intentione certa cuiusdam determinati effectus, alias haec essent a casu respectu Dei: consequitur illam praemotionem physicam esse praedeterminationem.” ↩

10. Cfr. Nazarius, Comment. in S. Theol. S. Thom., 1 p., qu. 22, art. 4: “Sublatâ a Deo physicae praemotionis efficacitate nulla relinquitur alia in Deo sufficiens causalitas respectu determinationis liberorum actuum et consequenter neque in Deo esse poterit talium praescientia futurorum.” See also Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 383 sqq., 400 sqq. ↩

11. Cfr. Contenson, Theol. Mentis et Cordis, l. VIII, diss. 2, specul. 3: “Generalem praemotionem ideo solum adstruimus, ut per eam ad gratiam per se efficacem uberius fortiusque stabiliendam viam muniamus ad eamque propugnandam serviat etiam philosophia.” ↩

12. Cfr. Alvarez, De Auxiliis, disp. 92, n. 6: “Repugnat ad invicem auxilium efficax ad consentiendum et actualis dissensus.” ↩

13. Cfr. Alvarez, op. cit., disp. 122, n. 16: “Efficacia auxilii praevenientis gratiae et connexio eius infallibilis cum libera cooperatione arbitrii tota fundatur et desumitur, tamquam ex prima radice, ex omnipotentia Dei atque ex absoluto et efficaci decreto voluntatis eius volentis, ut homo quem movet convertatur et pie operetur, nec huiusmodi efficacia ullo modo dependet etiam, tamquam a conditione sine qua non, ex futura cooperatione arbitrii creati.” ↩

14. Cfr. Alvarez, op. cit., disp. 19, n. 7: “Praedictum auxilium actuale determinat liberum arbitrium ad unam numero actionem, non subditur libero arbitrio quantum ad usum.” ↩

15. Cfr. Graveson, Epist. Theol. Polem., t. I, ep. 1: “Gratia thomistice sufficiens ita ex naturâ sua essentialiter distinguitur a gratia thomistice efficaci, ut numquam et in nullo casu gratia thomistice sufficiens evadere possit gratia efficax thomistice nec umquam ponatur actus secundus, nisi accesserit gratia efficax thomistice.” ↩

16. Prael. Theol., disp. 5, c. 6: “In gratia sufficiente totum id continetur quod ad potentiam bene operandi exigitur, non autem totum id quod ulterius requiritur ad actum; certum est enim in omni causa agente aliquid plus ad actum quam ad potentiam requiri.” ↩

17. Panoplia, t. IV, p. 2, tr. 3, c. 2: “Auxilium sufficiens ita sufficientiam tribuit ad operandum, si homo velit, quod defectus operationis nullo modo provenit ex insufficientia aliqua ipsius auxilii, sed tantum ex defectu arbitrii, quod ei resistit et impedimentum ponit.” ↩

18. Cfr. Limbourg, S. J., “Selbstzeichnung der thomistischen Gnadenlehre” in the Innsbruck Zeitschrift für kath. Theologie, 1877. ↩

19. Billuart, De Deo, diss. 8, art. 4, § 3. ↩

20. Cfr. Bañez, Comment. in S. Theol. S. Thom., 1 p., qu. 14, art. 13, concl. 14: “Nam voluntas creata infallibiliter deficiet circa quamcumque materiam virtutis, nisi efficaciter determinetur a divina voluntate ad bene operandum.” ↩

21. Other evasions are treated by Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 400 sqq. On the true notion of merely sufficient grace, v. Ch. I, Sect. 2, No. 6, supra. ↩

22. The Molinists also regard supernatural grace as a praemotio physica; cfr. Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 145 sq., Freiburg 1908. ↩

23. Gonet, Clypeus Theol. Thomist., disp. 9, art. 5, § 3. ↩

24. Cfr. Alvarez, De Auxiliis, disp. 22, n. 39: “Solus Deus propter suam infinitatem et omnipotentiam, quia est auctor voluntatis creatae, potest illam immutare conformiter ad suam naturam et movere efficaciter atque applicare ad producendum actum in particulari, non solum secundum substantiam, sed etiam secundum modum libertatis, quod tamen non potest alia causa creata.” ↩

25. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 282 sqq. ↩

26. Alvarez, De Auxiliis, disp. 22, n. 19: “Nam tamdiu manet libertas in voluntate, quamdiu intellectus illi repraesentat obiectum cum indifferentia.” ↩

27. De Deo, diss. 8, art. 4, § 2. ↩

28. De Auxiliis, disp. 92, n. 11: “Etiam posito auxilio efficaci in voluntate componitur cum illo potentia ad dissentiendum, quamvis nulla sit potentia ad coniungendum actualem dissensum cum auxilio efficaci [not: cum actuali consensu].” ↩

29. Sess. VI, cap. 5: “Homo … inspirationem illam [gratiam efficacem] recipiens … illam et abiicere potest.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 797). Sess. VI, can. 4: “Si quis dixerit, liberum hominis arbitrium a Deo motum et excitatum nihil cooperari assentiendo Deo excitanti atque vocanti, quo ad obtinendam iustificationis gratiam se disponat ac praeparet, neque posse dissentire, si velit, sed velut inanime quoddam nihil omnino agere mereque passive se habere, anathema sit.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 814.) ↩

30. Thus Alvarez, De Auxiliis, disp. 93, art. 1: “Nunc autem dicimus Concilium Tridentinum … numquam usum fuisse verbo illo ‘resistere,’ sed verbo ‘dissentire’ et ‘abiicere,’ ut insinuaret non esse idem formaliter resistere seu posse resistere auxilio efficaci et posse dissentire seu abiicere gratiam vocationis… . Unde licet arbitrium motum auxilio efficaci ad consentiendum possit dissentire, si velit, non tamen potest Deo resistere vel auxilio eius efficaci, secundum quod est instrumentum voluntatis divinae.” ↩

31. Sess. III, cap. 3: “Quare fides ipsa in se, etiamsi per caritatem non operetur, donum Dei est et actus eius est opus ad salutem pertinens, quo homo liberam praestet ipsi Deo obedientiam, gratiae eius cui resistere possit consentiendo et cooperando.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1791.) ↩

32. Cfr. Tepe, Instit. Theol., Vol. III, pp. 74 sqq., Paris 1896; Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 140 sqq., Freiburg 1908; Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 405 sqq., Freiburg 1901. On the teaching of St. Augustine see Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, thes. 50; on that of St. Thomas, L. de San, S. J., De Deo Uno, t. I: De Mente S. Thomae circa Praedeterminationes Physicas, Louvain 1894. ↩

33. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 383 sqq., 400 sqq. ↩

34. “Quidquid entitatis reperitur in quocumque actu peccati, etiamsi alias sit intrinsece malus, debet reduci in Deum tamquam in primam causam praemoventem et praedeterminantem actuali motione voluntatem creatam ad talem actum, inquantum actus est, secundum quod est ens.” Alvarez, De Auxil., disp. 24, n. 15. ↩

35. Cfr. Bañez, Comment. in S. Theol. S. Thom., 1 p., qu. 23, art. 3, dub. 2, conclus. 2: “Deus cognoscit cognitione intuitivâ peccatum, quatenus Dei voluntas est causa entitatis actus peccati et simul permittens, quod ad eundem actum concurrat liberum arbitrium deficiendo a regula.” ↩

36. Sess. VI, can. 6. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 253 sqq., 442 sqq. ↩

37. “Voluntas Adami ante peccatum non erat tibia curva, sed omnino recta, facta autem est curva ex promotione physica.” Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. II, 3rd ed., p. 137. ↩

38. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, pp. 72 sqq. ↩

39. Cfr. on this subject Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, thes. 41; T. Papagni, O. P., La Mente di S. Tommaso intorno alla Mozione Divina nelle Creature, p. 44, Benevento 1901. ↩

40. The principal representatives of Augustinianism are Berti, Bellelli, and Bertieri. ↩

41. Published at Rome in 1739 sqq. ↩

42. Cfr. his work Le Bajanisme et le Jansénisme Resuscités dans les Livres de Bellelli et de Berti, s. l., 1745. ↩

43. Cfr. Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 419 sqq. ↩

44. Cfr. Berti, De Theol. Disciplinis, XIV, 9, n. 6: “Sententia est Thomistarum et Augustinensium omnium affirmantium, gratiam efficacem esse se ipsâ, non talem reddi aut cooperatione liberi arbitrii aut ex circumstantiis congruis, utque certissime et infallibiliter cum effectu coniunctam esse.” ↩

45. Cfr. Berti, op. cit., XIV, 11: “In aequali gradu concupiscentiae et gratiae gratia concupiscentiae, non concupiscentia gratiae succumbet, quia homo etiam cum aequali virtute maiorem habet ad malum quam ad bonum inclinationem… . Agere et non agere in aequilibrio virium et determinare seipsum absque efficaci Dei praemotione est liberi arbitrii sani et robusti, non autem infirmi.” ↩

46. Cfr. Berti, De Theol. Disciplinis, XIV, 8, n. 18: “Quamvis sit haec efficax gratia antecedens et Deus sine nobis faciat ut velimus, nihilo tamen minus per illam non proponitur nobis bonum sub ratione omnis boni, quemadmodum proponitur beatis per lumen gloriae, ideoque remanet indifferentia iudicii et vera libertas.” ↩

47. Calvinism, Bajanism, Jansenism — Thomism, Augustinianism, Molinism, and Congruism. ↩

48. De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, c. 17. ↩

49. Cfr. Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, pp. 433 sqq. ↩

50. On the insufficiency of the indifferentia iudicii to preserve free-will, v. supra, p. 242. ↩

51. Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 6. ↩

52. “Proponitur praemium ut pecces, i. e. quod te delectat,” he says; ”. . . Terreris minis, facis propter quod times… . Si cupiditas non valuit, forte timor valebit ut pecces… . Itaque ad omne recte factum amor et timor ducit. Ut facias bene, amas Deum et times Deum: ut autem facias male, amas mundum et times mundum.” In Ps., 79, c. 13. ↩

53. Cfr. Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 422 sqq.; Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, thes. 54. ↩