The Properties of Actual Grace — Section 3: The Universality of Grace, Article 3: Predestination

ARTICLE 3: THE PREDESTINATION OF THE ELECT

1. What is Meant by Predestination

We have shown that God antecedently wills to save all men,¹ and that He gives to all sufficient grace to work out their eternal salvation.

On the other hand, Sacred Scripture assures us that some are lost through their own fault. Cfr. Matth. XXV, 41: “Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire.”

It follows that God’s will to save, considered as voluntas consequens, remains ineffective with regard to a portion of the human race, and consequently, in this respect, is no longer universal but particular.

Being omniscient, God has foreseen this from all eternity and disposed His decrees accordingly. It is in this sense that Catholic theology teaches the existence of a twofold predestination: one to Heaven, for those who die in the state of grace, another to hell, for those who depart this life in mortal sin.

Present-day usage reserves the term predestination for the election of the blessed.

a) Rightly does the Council of Trent call predestination a “hidden mystery.”² For in the last analysis it rests solely with God, who are to be admitted to Heaven and who condemned to hell. But why does God give to some merely sufficient grace, with which they neglect to coöperate, while on others He showers efficacious graces that infallibly lead to eternal salvation? In this unequal distribution of efficacious grace lies the sublime mystery of predestination, as St. Augustine well knew, for he says in his treatise On the Gift of Perseverance: “Therefore, of two infants equally bound by original sin, why the one is taken and the other left; and of two wicked men already mature in years, why one should be so called that he follows Him that calleth, while the other is either not called at all, or is not called in such a manner,—are unsearchable judgments of God.”³

b) What is meant by “predestination of the elect”? In view of the many errors that have arisen with regard to this important dogma, it is necessary to start with clearly defined terms.

Predestination may mean one of three different things. A man may be simply predestined to receive certain graces (praedestinatio ad gratiam tantum); or he may be predestined to enjoy eternal happiness without regard to any merits of his own (praedestinatio ad gloriam tantum); or, again, he may be predestined to both grace and glory, glory as the end, grace as a means to that end—vocation, justification, and final perseverance. When the concepts of grace and glory are considered separately, and each is made the object of a special predestination, we have what is called incomplete or inadequate predestination (praedestinatio incompleta sive inadaequata). It is this incomplete predestination that St. Paul⁴ and St. Augustine⁵ have in mind when they apply the term to the vocation of men to grace, faith, and justification. Theologians speak of praedestinatio ad gloriam tantum, that is, ante praevisa merita, as a true predestination, but disagree as to its existence.⁶

The dogma of predestination, which mainly concerns us here, has for its sole object predestination in the complete or adequate sense of the term, which is explained by St. Augustine as follows: “Predestination is nothing else than the foreknowledge and the preparation of those gifts of God whereby they who are delivered are most certainly delivered [i. e. saved].”⁷ St. Thomas expresses himself more succinctly: “Predestination is the preparation of grace in the present, and of glory in the future.”⁸

2. The Dogma

Complete predestination involves: (a) the first grace of vocation (gratia prima praeveniens), especially faith as the beginning, foundation, and root of justification; (b) a number of additional actual graces for the successful accomplishment of the process; (c) justification itself as the beginning of the state of grace; (d) the grace of final perseverance; (e) eternal happiness in Heaven.

The question arises: Do men really seek and find their eternal salvation with infallible certainty by passing through these successive stages—not merely in the foreknowledge of God (praescientia futurorum), but by virtue of an eternal decree (decretum praedestinationis)?

The Pelagians asserted that man works out his eternal salvation of his own free will, and that consequently God merely foreknows but does not fore-ordain who shall be saved. The Semipelagians held that the beginning of faith (initium fidei) and final perseverance (donum perseverantiae) are not pure graces but may be obtained by natural means, without special aid from above. Against these heretics the Catholic Church has always taught the eternal predestination of the elect as an article of faith.⁹

a) St. Paul says explicitly: “We know that to them that love God, all things work together unto good, to such as, according to his purpose, are called to be saints. For whom he foreknew, he also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of his Son; that he might be the firstborn amongst many brethren. And whom he predestinated, them he also called. And whom he called, them he also justified. And whom he justified, them he also glorified.”¹⁰ Here we have all the elements of complete predestination: God’s eternal foreknowledge (praescivit, προέγνω), an eternal decree of the divine will (praedestinavit, προώρισε), and the various stages of justification, beginning with vocation (vocavit, ἐκάλησε) up to justification proper (iustificavit, ἐδικαίωσε), and eternal beatitude (glorificavit, ἐδόξασεν).¹¹

b) The Fathers of the fifth century undoubtedly taught the predestination of the elect as an article of faith. Thus St. Augustine says: “There never was a time when the Church of Christ did not hold this faith in predestination, which is now defended with fresh solicitude against the new heretics.”¹² His faithful disciple St. Prosper writes: “No Catholic denies predestination by God.”¹³ And again: “It would be as impious to deny predestination as to oppose grace itself.”¹⁴

c) Several important theological corollaries follow from the dogma of predestination.

α) The first is the immutability of the divine decree of predestination. This immutability is based on God’s infallible foreknowledge that certain individuals will die in the state of grace, and on His unchangeable will to reward them with eternal happiness.

St. Augustine says: “If any one of these [the predestined] perishes, God is mistaken; but none of them perish because God is not mistaken.”¹⁵

God’s unerring foreknowledge is symbolized by the “Book of Life.”¹⁶ Christ Himself said to His Apostles: “Rejoice in this, that your names are written in heaven.”¹⁷ The “Book of Life” admits neither addition nor erasure. This does not, however, mean that a man is unable to change God’s hypothetical decree of predestination with regard to himself into an absolute one. He can do this by prayer, good works, and faithful coöperation with grace.¹⁸ Whatever promotes our salvation is included in the infallible foreknowledge of God, and consequently also in the scope of predestination. In this sense, but in no other, can we accept the somewhat paradoxical maxim: “If you are not predestined, conduct yourself so that you may be predestined.” Sacred Scripture occasionally refers to another “Book of Life,” which contains the names of all the faithful, irrespective of their predestination. This “book,” of course, is capable of alterations. Cfr. Apoc. III, 5: “I will not blot out his name out of the book of life.”¹⁹ Finally, there is the “Book of Reprobation,” which records the wicked deeds of men and by which the unrepentant sinners will be judged. This is the “liber scriptus” of the “Dies Irae”:

“Liber scriptus proferetur. In quo totum continetur.”²⁰

β) If the divine decree of predestination is immutable, the number of the elect must be definitively fixed. “The number [of those who are predestined to the kingdom of God] is so certain,” says St. Augustine, “that no one can either be added to or taken from them.”²¹ We must distinguish between the absolute and the relative number of the predestined.

God, being omniscient, knows not only the abstract number of the elect, but every individual predestined to Heaven. To us the number of the elect is wrapped in impenetrable mystery. St. Thomas justly observes: “Some say that as many men will be saved as angels fell; some, so many as there were angels left; others, in fine, so many as the number of angels who fell, added to that of all the angels created by God. It is, however, better to say that ‘God alone knows the number for whom is reserved eternal happiness,’ as the prayer for the living and the dead expresses it.”²² Whether God will round out the number of the elect by suddenly precipitating the end of the world or by a sort of “natural selection,” is an open question. To assume the latter could hardly be reconciled with the dogma of the universality of His saving will. St. Augustine seems to favor the former.²³

As regards the relative number of the elect, some writers (e. g. Massillon) represent it as so infinitesimally small that it would almost drive a saint to despair,—“as if the Church had been established for the express purpose of populating hell.”²⁴ Even St. Thomas held that relatively few are saved.²⁵ But the arguments adduced in support of this contention are by no means convincing.²⁶ Recently, the Jesuit Father Castelein²⁷ impugned the rigorist theory with weighty arguments. He was sharply attacked by the Redemptorist Godts,²⁸ who marshalled a great number of authorities in favor of the sterner view. The controversy cannot be decided either on Scriptural or traditional grounds. In our pessimistic age it is more grateful and consoling to assume that the majority of Christians, especially Catholics, will be saved.²⁹ If we add to this number not a few Jews, Mohammedans, and heathens, it is probably safe to estimate the number of the elect as at least equal to that of the reprobates. Were it smaller, “it could be said to the shame and offense of the divine majesty and mercy, that the [future] kingdom of Satan is larger than the kingdom of Christ.”³⁰

3. The Motive of Predestination

The efficient cause of predestination is God; its instrumental cause, grace; its final cause, the divine glory; its primary meritorious cause, the merits of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. On these points all theologians are agreed. Not so as to the motive that induced God to predestine certain individuals to the exclusion of others. The question narrows itself down to this: What influence, if any, do the merits of a man exert on the eternal decree of predestination?—and may be formulated in three different ways.

a) What influence do the merits of a man exert on his predestination to the initial grace of vocation? Recalling the dogma of the absolute gratuity of grace, our answer must be: None. For whatever merits one may have acquired before he receives the initial grace of vocation, must be purely natural, and consequently worthless in the eyes of God for supernatural predestination. “To assume,” says St. Thomas, “that there is on our part some merit, the foreknowledge of which [on the part of God] would be the cause [motive] of our predestination, would be to assume that grace is given to us [as a reward] of our [natural] merits.”³¹

b) What influence do the merits of a man exert on his predestination to grace and glory? Catholic theologians are unanimous in holding that, since grace is absolutely gratuitous and inseparably connected with glory as its effect, the union of both can no more be based upon natural merit than the initial grace of vocation itself, which transmits the quality of gratuitousness to each and every one of the graces that follow in its wake, up to and including justification and eternal beatitude. Those among the Fathers who defended the gratuity of predestination against the Pelagians and Semipelagians, really aimed at safeguarding the gratuity of initial grace, in order not to be constrained to say with Pelagius that “the grace of God is given as a reward of merit.”³² “What compelled me in this work of mine [De Dono Perseverantiae] to defend more abundantly and clearly those passages of Scripture in which predestination is commended,” says St. Augustine, “if not the Pelagian assertion that God’s grace is given according to our [natural] merits?”³³ Obviously these Fathers did not have in view the praedestinatio ad gloriam tantum, as the champions of the praedestinatio ante praevisa merita mistakenly assert, but what they meant was that complete predestination which comprises grace and glory as one whole. Similarly, the early Schoolmen, when they speak of the “gratuity of predestination,” usually mean complete predestination.³⁴ D’Argentré’s researches show how necessary it is to draw sharp distinctions and carefully to establish the real state of the question before claiming the common teaching of the Scholastics in favor of any particular theory of predestination.

c) What influence do the supernatural merits of a man exert on his predestination to glory as such? Here the controversy begins. Predestination may be considered either as the cause of supernatural merit or as its effect. If it is considered as the cause, the problem takes this shape: Did God, by an absolute decree, and without any regard to their future supernatural merits, eternally predestine certain men to the glory of heaven, and only subsequently decide to give them the efficacious graces necessary to reach that end, particularly final perseverance? If, on the other hand, predestination be considered as an effect of supernatural merit, the question will be: Did God predestine certain men to the glory of Heaven by a merely hypothetical decree, making His will to save them dependent on His infallible foreknowledge of their supernatural merits? The lack of decisive Scriptural and Patristic texts on this subject has led to a division of Catholic opinion, some theologians favoring absolute predestination ante praevisa merita, others hypothetical predestination post praevisa merita. Without concealing our conviction that absolute predestination is untenable, we shall set forth both theories impartially and examine the arguments on which they rely.

4. Orthodox Predestinationism, or the Theory of Predestination Ante Praevisa Merita

Some theologians conceive the divine scheme of salvation in this wise: (a) In ordine intentionis, God, by an absolute decree, first predestines certain men to eternal salvation, and then, in consequence of this decree, decides to give them all the graces necessary to be saved; (b) in time, however, or in ordine executionis, He observes the reverse order, that is to say, He first bestows the pre-appointed graces and subsequently the glory of heaven as a reward of supernatural merit acquired by the aid of those graces.

This theory reverses the relation of grace and glory. While it correctly³⁵ represents glory as the fruit and reward of supernatural merit in the order of execution, it wrongly represents it in the order of intention as the cause of supernatural merit, whereas it is merely an effect. This opinion is championed by most Thomists,³⁶ some Augustinians,³⁷ and a few Molinists.³⁸ Their arguments may be sketched as follows:

a) In innumerable passages of Sacred Scripture predestination to eternal happiness is represented as a work of pure mercy, nay, even as an arbitrary act of God. Take, e. g., Matth. XXIV, 22 sqq.: “And unless those days had been shortened, no flesh should be saved: but for the sake of the elect those days shall be shortened… . For there shall arise false Christs and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders, insomuch as to deceive (if possible) even the elect.”³⁹ Here, it is claimed, the elect are represented as so thoroughly confirmed in faith and in good works as to be proof against error.

This conclusion is unwarranted. The phrase “those days” manifestly refers either to the destruction of Jerusalem or to the end of the world. If it refers to the destruction of Jerusalem, the “elect,” according to Biblical usage,⁴⁰ are the faithful Christian inhabitants of the Holy City, for whose sake God promises to shorten the terrible siege. If it referred to the end of the world, electi would indeed stand for praedestinati, but the context would not forbid us to interpret their predestination hypothetically, as merely indicating the immutability of the divine decree, which is not denied by the opponents of the theory.

Another text quoted in favor of absolute predestination ante praevisa merita, is Acts XIII, 48: “As many as were ordained (praeordinati, τεταγμένοι) to life everlasting, believed.” Here, we are told, predestination to eternal life is given as the motive why many believed. But the text really says nothing at all about predestination. Τεταγμένοι is not synonymous with προτεταγμένοι or προωρισμένοι. The more probable explanation is the following: As many believed as were disposed to receive the faith. It is wellnigh impossible to assume that all who received the faith at that time were predestined, while those that refused to be converted were without exception reprobates. But even if praeordinati were synonymous with praedestinati, the text would merely say that certain predestined souls embraced the faith, without affording any clue as to the relation between conversion and predestination.

The ninth chapter of St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans is the main reliance of the advocates of absolute predestinationism, though the passage is unfit to serve as a locus classicus because of its obscurity. Let us examine a few of the verses most frequently quoted. Rom. IX, 13: “Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated,” is alleged to prove the absolute predestination of Jacob and the negative reprobation of Esau. But many theologians hold that Esau was saved, and, besides, the Apostle is not dealing with predestination to glory, but with Jacob’s vocation to be the progenitor of the Messias. Esau, who was not an Israelite but an Idumaean, was simply passed over in this choice (odio habere = minus diligere; cfr. Matth. X, 37). If the passage is interpreted typically, it should be done in harmony with the context, that is to say, as referring to the gratuity of grace, not to predestination.

The same may be said of Rom. IX, 16 and 18: “It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy… . He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth.”⁴¹

The strongest text alleged by the advocates of absolute predestination is Rom. IX, 20 sq.: “O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it: Why hast thou made me thus? Or hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor and another unto dishonor?” Here the Apostle really seems to have thought of predestination. But the simile must not be pressed, lest we arrive at the Calvinistic blasphemy that God positively predestined some men to heaven and others to hell. The tertium comparationis is not the act of the Divine Artificer, but the willingness of man to yield his will to God like clay in the hands of a potter.

Nor is it admissible to read into the Apostle’s thought even a negative reprobation of certain men. For the primary intention of the Epistle to the Romans is to insist on the gratuity of man’s vocation to Christianity and to reject the presumption that the Mosaic law and their bodily descent from Abraham gave the Jews preference over the heathens. The Epistle to the Romans has no bearing whatever on the speculative question whether or not the free vocation of grace is a necessary result of eternal predestination to glory.⁴²

b) Among the Fathers the only one to whom the advocates of absolute predestinationism can appeal with some show of justice is St. Augustine, who, with the possible exception of Prosper and Fulgentius, was the most rigorous among early ecclesiastical writers,—so rigorous, in fact, that Oswald does not hesitate to call him “the head and front of all rigorists in the Church.”⁴³

However, this is saying too much. Augustine’s genuine teaching is still in dispute among our ablest theologians. Some⁴⁴ deny that he broke with the almost unanimous teaching of his predecessors, while others think that in the treatises De Dono Perseverantiae and De Praedestinatione Sanctorum, and in several of his letters, the Saint frankly taught absolute predestinationism. The latter group of writers is split into two classes. A number of Thomists and Cardinal Bellarmine not only assert that Augustine taught absolute predestination, but boldly adopt his supposed teaching. Petavius, Maldonatus, Cercià, Oswald, and others censure this view. Franzelin⁴⁵ undoubtedly strikes the right note when he says: “If there were a manifest discrepancy between Augustine’s teaching and that of the other Fathers, I should not hesitate to follow Pighius, Catharinus, Osorius, Camerarius, Maldonatus, Toletus,⁴⁶ and Petavius⁴⁷ and Petavius⁴⁸ in reverently departing from his doctrine, because in that case we should be dealing merely with a private opinion.”⁴⁹ Under these circumstances the Patristic argument for the theory of absolute predestination evidently lacks convincingness.⁵⁰

c) It was probably because they felt its weakness that some of the later champions of the theory attempted to prove absolute predestination ante praevisa merita by philosophical arguments. Gonet reasons as follows: “He who proceeds in an orderly way, wills the end before he wills the means necessary to attain it. But God proceeds in an orderly way. Therefore he wills the end before the means. Now, glory is an end, and merits are means to attain that end. Consequently, God wills glory before He wills merits, and a man’s preëlection to glory cannot be based on foreknowledge of his merits.”⁵¹ This argument, if it proved anything, would prove the logical impossibility of conditional predestination. But it overshoots the mark and consequently proves nothing at all. Qui nimium probat, nihil probat.

Gonet moreover assumes what he sets out to prove, namely, that God voluntate antecedente decreed the glory of certain men to the exclusion of others. This petitio principii vitiates the entire polysyllogism. God’s will to save is universal. He wills the eternal happiness of all men antecedenter, and the reprobation of some only consequenter; hence eternal predestination is not absolute, but hypothetical, that is, it depends on merit. That the divine scheme of grace can take a different course in ordine intentionis from that in ordine executionis is a mere fiction. If eternal salvation in the order of temporal execution is given only as a reward of merit, it must be a reward of merit also in the order of intention. In both cases predestination depends upon a future condition.

Perhaps the worst feature of the theory of absolute predestination is the fact that it involves the absolute reprobation of those not predestined to glory. “If it could be validly argued,” says Gutberlet, “that, since the end must be willed before the means, salvation must be decreed before the means to its attainment (i. e. merits), the argument would be applicable also to the damned. If God voluntate antecedente wills to lead only a few to salvation, and if this intention must precede every other, then He must likewise voluntate antecedente have in view the end of the reprobates, which is His own glorification through the manifestation of His justice and mercy. Hence He must also decree the means necessary to obtain this end, i. e. He must cause these unfortunate creatures to sin, in order that they may reach the end for which He has predestined them; in other words, He must pre-ordain them to sin and eternal damnation,”⁵² which is what Calvin teaches. The advocates of the theory naturally shrink from adopting such a blasphemous conclusion, and fall back upon the theory of negative reprobation, which, however, amounts practically to the same thing.⁵³

5. The Theory of Hypothetical Predestination Post Praevisa Merita

Predestination, like God’s will to save all men, is based on a hypothetical decree. Those only are predestined to eternal happiness who shall merit it as a reward. It is solely by reason of His infallible foreknowledge of these merits that God’s hypothetical decree of predestination becomes absolute. Or, as Becanus puts it, “God first prepared the gifts of grace, and then elected to eternal life those whose good use of the gifts He foresaw.”⁵⁴

This view, which strongly appeals to us for the reason that it sets aside the cruel theory of “negative reprobation,” was defended by such earlier Scholastics as Alexander of Hales and Albertus Magnus, and by many eminent later writers, e. g. Toletus, Lessius, Frassen, Stapleton, Tournely, and is held to-day by nearly all theologians outside the Thomist school. What gave it special authority in modern times was the recommendation of St. Francis de Sales, who, in a letter to Lessius (Aug. 26, 1618) described the theory of conditional predestination post praevisa merita as “more in harmony with the mercy and grace of God, truer and more attractive.”⁵⁵ This view has a solid basis both in Scripture and Tradition.

a) Holy Scripture clearly teaches the universality of God’s saving will. Now if God voluntate antecedente wills the eternal salvation of all men without exception,⁵⁶ He cannot possibly intend that only some shall be saved.

It is further to be noted that the Bible makes not only the temporal realization but likewise the eternal promise of glory dependent on the performance of good works. St. Paul, whose Epistle to the Romans is cited as a locus classicus by the advocates of the theory,⁵⁷ wrote towards the end of his life to Timothy: “I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith. As to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord the just judge will render to me in that day.”⁵⁸ In writing these lines the Apostle no doubt had in mind the sentence of the Universal Judge: “Come, ye blessed of my Father, possess you the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world,“⁵⁹—which may with far greater reason be termed a “classical” text than the obscure ninth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. To prepare for men the kingdom of heaven from the foundation (i. e. beginning) of the world, is to predestine them to eternal happiness. Now, God has “prepared” the kingdom of heaven for men in view of their foreseen merits, that is to say, conditionally. The causal conjunction enim in the sentence following the one just quoted (Matth. XXVI, 25): “Esurivi enim et dedistis mihi manducare, etc.,” refers to the entire preceding sentence, not only to the possidete in time, but also to the paratum in eternity. Consequently, the eternal decree of predestination itself, like its temporal execution, depends on good works or merit. This interpretation of Matth. XXV, 34-36 is confirmed by the sentence pronounced upon the reprobates, Matth. XXV, 41 sqq.: “Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels. For I was hungry, and you gave me not to eat, etc.” The “everlasting fire” is manifestly decreed from all eternity in the same sense in which it is inflicted in time, namely, propter et post praevisa merita. Billuart’s contention⁶⁰ that hell has been prepared solely for “the devil and his angels” is untenable, because in several other Scriptural passages⁶¹ the reprobates are expressly classed among the followers of Satan. If we add to this that our Divine Lord, in foretelling the last judgment, had naturally to formulate his prediction so as not only to show its absolute justice but likewise to intimate that, had they so willed, the damned might have had their place on the right hand of the Great Judge, we must admit that the theory of predestination post praevisa merita has a solid foundation in Scripture.⁶²

b) The Greek Fathers unanimously favor hypothetical predestination, which fact has caused the theory to be commonly referred to as “sententia Graecorum.”⁶³

Thus St. Chrysostom interprets the judgment of the Son of Man as follows: “Possess ye the kingdom [of heaven] as your own by heredity, as a paternal heritage, as a gift long due to you; for it was prepared and arranged for you before you came into existence, because I knew beforehand that you would be what you are.”⁶⁴ Theodoret says: “He did not simply predestine [men], but He predestined them because He foreknew [their merits].”⁶⁵

The Latin Fathers before St. Augustine all without exception taught hypothetical predestination. St. Hilary says: “Many are called, but few are chosen… . Hence election is not a matter of indiscriminate choice, but a selection based on merit.”⁶⁶ And St. Ambrose: “Therefore the Apostle says: ‘Whom he foreknew he also predestined’ (Rom. VIII, 29); for He did not predestine before He foreknew, but He predestined a reward to those whose merits He foresaw.”⁶⁷

The question cannot, as Bellarmine contends,⁶⁸ be decided on the sole authority of St. Augustine, because he is claimed by both parties to the controversy.⁶⁹

On account of the existing differences of opinion it is impossible to establish the theory of hypothetical predestination on the basis of Scholastic teaching.⁷⁰ The opinion of St. Thomas is in dispute;⁷¹ likewise that of St. Bonaventure. Scotus in his controversy with Henry of Ghent shows a disposition to favor absolute predestination, but leaves the question open. “Let every one,” he says,⁷² “choose whichever opinion suits him best, without prejudice to the divine liberty, which must be safeguarded against injustice, and to the other truths that are to be held in respect of God.”⁷³

6. A Compromise Theory

For the sake of completeness we will add a few words on a theory which takes middle ground between the two just mentioned. Its champions, Ockam,⁷⁴ Gabriel Biel,⁷⁵ Ysambert,⁷⁶ and Ambrosius Catharinus,⁷⁷ have reviewed, holding that, while the common run of humanity is predestined hypothetically, a few exceptionally favored Saints enjoy the privilege of absolute predestination.

Among the champions of this “eclectic” theory may be mentioned: Ockam, Gabriel Biel, Ysambert, and Ambrosius Catharinus. The Saints regarded by these writers as absolutely predestined to eternal glory are: the Blessed Virgin Mary, the prophets and Apostles, St. Joseph, St. Aloysius, and a few others, as well as all infants dying in the grace of Baptism. Billuart,⁷⁸ Dominicus Soto, and certain other divines attack this theory on the ground that it makes the salvation of the great majority of the elect a matter of chance and thereby imperils the dogmatic teaching of the Church. This objection is unfounded. For though the “eclectic” theory has little or no support either in Revelation or in reason, it sufficiently safeguards the dogma of predestination by admitting that voluntate consequente none but the predestined can attain to eternal beatitude.

Only with regard to the Blessed Virgin Mary are we inclined to make an exception. It is probable that she was predestined to eternal glory ante praevisa merita, because, in the words of Lessius, the privileges she enjoyed “exceed all measure and must not be extended to any other human being.”⁷⁹

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Footnotes

1. See Articles 1 and 2, supra. ↩

2. Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 12: “Arcanum divinae praedestinationis mysterium.” ↩

3. De Dono Perseverantiae, n. 21: “Ex duobus parvulis originali peccato pariter obstrictis cur iste assumatur et ex duobus iam grandibus impiis, cur iste ita vocetur ut vocantem sequatur, ille autem aut non vocetur [praedicatione fidei] aut non ita vocetur, inscrutabilia sunt iudicia Dei.” On this mysterious dispensation see Scheeben, Die Mysterien des Christentums, §99-103, 3rd ed., Freiburg 1912, and Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, thes. 62. ↩

4. Eph. I, 3 sqq., and in other passages. ↩

5. De Dono Persev., c. 10, n. 19: “Praedestinatio est praeparatio gratiae praeparatio, gratia vero iam ipsa donatio.” ↩

6. V. infra, pp. 199 sqq. ↩

7. De Dono Persev., c. 14, n. 35: “Praedestinatio nihil est aliud quam praescientia et praeparatio beneficiorum Dei, quibus certissime liberantur [scil. salvantur] quicunque liberantur.” ↩

8. S. Theol., 1a, qu. 23, art. 2: “Praedestinatio est praeparatio gratiae in praesenti et gloriae in futuro.” On the Biblical, the Patristic, and the theological use of the term, see Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. II, 3rd ed., pp. 189 sqq., Freiburg 1906. ↩

9. The Tridentine Council presupposes it as an unquestioned dogma (Sess. VI, cap. 12). ↩

10. Rom. VIII, 28 sqq.: “Scimus autem quoniam diligentibus Deum omnia cooperantur in bonum, iis qui secundum propositum vocati sunt sancti (κατὰ πρόθεσιν κληθεῖσιν). Nam quos praescivit, et praedestinavit conformes fieri imaginis Filii sui, ut sit ipse primogenitus in multis fratribus; quos autem praedestinavit, hos et vocavit; et quos vocavit, hos et iustificavit: quos autem iustificavit, illos et glorificavit.” ↩

11. Cfr. Eph. I, 4-11. ↩

12. De Praedestinatione Sanctorum, c. 25: “Praedestinationis huius fidem, quae contra novos haereticos novâ solicitudine defenditur, nunquam Ecclesia Christi non habuit.” ↩

13. Resp. ad Obiect. Gallor., 1: “Praedestinationem Dei nullus Catholicus negat.” ↩

14. Ep. ad Rufin.: “Praedestinationem tam impium est negare quam ipsi gratiae contraire.” ↩

15. De Correptione et Gratia, c. 7, n. 14: “Horum si quisquam perit, fallitur Deus; sed nemo eorum perit, quia non fallitur Deus.” On the question how this infallible foreknowledge is compatible with the dogma of free-will, see Pohle-Preuss, God, His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 364 sqq. ↩

16. Cfr. Apoc. XVII, 8: “Liber vitae,” τὸ βιβλίον τῆς ζωῆς. Cfr. St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, XX, 13: “Praescientia Dei, quae non potest falli, liber vitae est.” ↩

17. Luke X, 20: “Gaudete quod nomina vestra scripta sunt in coelis.” ↩

18. Cfr. 2 Pet. I, 10: “Satagite, ut per bona opera certam (βεβαίαν) vestram vocationem et electionem faciatis.” ↩

19. Apoc. III, 5: “Non delebo nomen eius de libro vitae.” Cfr. Ex. XXXII, 32; Ps. LXVIII, 29. ↩

20. On the liber vitae, cfr. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 24, art. 1-3; and Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. VIII, § 435. ↩

21. De Corrept. et Grat., c. 13: ”… quorum ita certus est numerus, ut nec addatur eis quisquam nec minuatur ex eis.” ↩

22. S. Theol., 1a, qu. 23, art. 7: “De numero omnium praedestinatorum hominum quis sit, dicunt quidam, quot angeli ceciderunt; quidam vero, quot ex hominibus salvabuntur, quot angeli ceciderunt; quidam vero, quod tot ex hominibus salvabuntur, quot angeli remanserunt; quidam vero, quod tot ex hominibus salvabuntur, quot angeli ceciderunt et insuper tot quot fuerunt angeli creati. Sed melius dicitur quod soli Deo est cognitus numerus electorum in superna felicitate locandus, ut habet collecta pro vivis et defunctis.” ↩

23. De Bono Viduitatis, n. 28: “Quasi propter aliud retardetur hoc saeculum, nisi ut impleatur praedestinatus numerus ille sanctorum, quo citius impleto profecto nec terminus saeculi differetur.” ↩

24. Dieringer, Epistelbuch, “Fest Allerheiligen.” ↩

25. S. Theol., 1a, qu. 23, art. 7, ad 3: “Pauciores sunt qui salvantur.” ↩

26. Cfr. Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dogmat. Theol., Vol. VIII, pp. 363 sqq., and W. Schneider, Das andere Leben, 9th ed., pp. 476 sqq., Paderborn 1908. ↩

27. Le Rigorisme, le Nombre des Élus et la Doctrine du Salut, 2nd ed., Bruxelles 1899. ↩

28. De Paucitate Salvandorum quid Docuerunt Sancti, 3d ed., Bruxelles 1899. ↩

29. Cfr. 1 Tim. IV, 10: σωτὴρ πάντων ἀνθρώπων, μάλιστα πιστῶν. This opinion is convincingly defended by the Spanish theologian Genér (Theol. Dogmat. Scholast., II, 342 sqq., Rome 1767.) Timid souls may profitably ponder what Thomas à Kempis says in the Imitation, I, 25. ↩

30. Genér, Theol. Dogmat. Scholast., II, 342: ”… ne dici possit cum dedecore et iniuria divinae maiestatis et clementiae, maius esse imperium daemonis quam Christi.” ↩

31. Lect. in Ep. ad Rom., VIII, 6: “Unde ponere quod aliquod meritum ex parte nostra praesupponatur, cuius praescientia sit ratio [scil. motivum] praedestinationis, nihil est aliud quam supponere gratiam dari ex meritis nostris [scil. naturalibus].” V. supra, Ch. II, Sect. 2. ↩

32. “Gratiam Dei secundum merita dari.” ↩

33. De Dono Perseverant., n. 53: “Quid autem coegit loca Scripturarum, quibus praedestinatio commendata est, copiosius et enucleatius isto nostro labore defendi, nisi quod Pelagiani dicunt, gratiam Dei secundum merita nostra [naturalia] dari?” ↩

34. Charles Du Plessis d’Argentré (d. 1740), after a careful study of all Scholastic works written between 1120 and 1708, concluded: “Veteres Scholastici de causa praedestinationis omnino considerate et ad gratiam et ad gloriam praecipue agebant. Ideo nolebant eam esse ex praevisis meritis, quia gratia, quae in ea includitur, non datur nec proin praedestinatur ob praevisa merita.” (De Praedest., c. 10, § 1). ↩

35. V. infra, Part II, Ch. III, Sect. 3. ↩

36. E. g., Bañez, Alvarez, Lemos, Gonet, Contenson, Goudin. ↩

37. E. g., Berti and Norisius. ↩

38. E. g., Suarez, Ruiz, De Lugo, Bellarmine. ↩

39. “Nisi breviati fuissent dies illi, non fieret salva omnis caro, sed propter electos (διὰ τοὺς ἐκλεκτούς) breviabuntur dies illi… . Surgent enim pseudochristi, … ita ut in errorem inducantur, si fieri potest, etiam electi.” ↩

40. Cfr. Col. III, 12; 1 Pet. I, 1. ↩

41. “Non volentis neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei… . Cuius vult miseretur, et quem vult indurat.” On the meaning of this text v. supra, pp. 137, 177. ↩

42. Cfr. Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 65; Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dogmat. Theol., Vol. VIII, pp. 345 sqq.; Val. Weber, Kritische Geschichte der Exegese des 9. Kapitels des Römerbriefes, Würzburg 1889. ↩

43. Die Lehre von der Heiligung, p. 242, 3rd ed., Paderborn 1885. ↩

44. E. g., Petrus de Comitibus, O. S. A. (De Praedest. et Reprobat., disp. 3, art. 4 sqq.), Tricassinus (De Praedest.), and the Jesuits Lessius, Gregory of Valentia, Franzelin, and Schrader. ↩

45. De Deo Uno, p. 677: “Si vero dissensus esset manifestus, ut prudenter [cum ceteris patribus] conciliari non posset, tum sane non dubitarem, cum Pighio, Catharino, Osorio, Camerario, Maldonato, Toleto, Petavio, reverenter ab Augustino discedere, quum haec non posset esse nisi privata eius sententia.” ↩

46. De Praedest., qu. 4. ↩

47. Comment. in S. Theol. S. Thomae Aqu., I, qu. 23, art. 5, conclus. 2. ↩

48. De Deo, X, col. 9. ↩

49. A careful analysis of the Augustinian texts bearing on this question will be found in the Theol. Wirceburg., De Deo Uno, n. 231 sqq., and Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 53. ↩

50. Cfr. Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dogmat. Theologie, Vol. VIII, pp. 351 sqq. ↩

51. Clypeus Thomist., De Praedest., disp. 2, § 2, n. 26: “Qui ordinate vult, prius vult finem quam media ad finem. Sed Deus ordinate vult. Ergo prius vult finem quam media ad illum. Atqui gloria est finis et merita sunt media ad illum conducentia. Ergo prius vult gloriam quam merita, et consequenter electio ad gloriam non potest esse ex praevisione meritorum.” ↩

52. Cfr. Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dogmat. Theol., Vol. VIII, p. 330. ↩

53. V. Art. 4, No. 2, infra. The opposite opinion is defended by Billuart (De Deo, diss. 9, art. 4, § 3 (ed. Lequette, p. 386). ↩

54. Orth. Praed., c. 1, n. 7: “Deus primo praeparavit dona gratiae ac deinde elegit eos, quos praevidebat bene usuros eiusmodi donis, elegit ad vitam aeternam.” ↩

55. ”… sententiam illam antiquitate, suavitate ac Scripturarum nativâ auctoritate nobilissimam de praedestinatione ad gloriam post praevisa merita semper ut Dei misericordiae ac gratiae magis consentaneam, veriorem ac amabiliorem existimavi.” (Cfr. Traité de l’Amour de Dieu, III, 5). ↩

56. V. supra, pp. 153 sqq. ↩

57. V. supra, No. 4. ↩

58. 2 Tim. IV, 7 sq.: “Bonum certamen certavi, cursum consummavi, fidem servavi; in reliquo reposita est (ἀπόκειται=praeparata ab aeterno) mihi corona iustitiae, quam reddet (ἀποδώσει) mihi Dominus in illa die, iustus iudex.” Cfr. 1 Cor. IX, 24 sqq.; Apoc. II, 7, 26. ↩

59. Matth. XXV, 34 sqq.: “Venite, benedicti Patris mei, possidete paratum vobis regnum a constitutione mundi.” ↩

60. De Deo, ed. Lequette, p. 391. ↩

61. For instance, John VIII, 44; 1 John III, 8; Acts XIII, 10. ↩

62. Cfr. Tepe, Inst. Theol., Vol. III, pp. 289 sqq., Paris 1896; Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dogmat. Theol., Vol. VIII, § 430. ↩

63. Lessius, Antapol., prop. 8: “Tenent hanc sententiam omnes Patres Graeci, adeo ut communiter dicatur esse sententia Graecorum.” ↩

64. Hom. in Matth., 80, n. 2: “Haereditate possidete regnum quasi proprium, quasi paternum et vestrum, iam olim vobis debitum; priusquam enim existeretis, haec vobis parata erant et disposita, quia ego vos tales futuros esse praescivi.” ↩

65. In Rom., VIII, 29 (Migne, P. G., LXXXII, 142): “Non simpliciter praedestinavit, sed quum praescivisset, praedestinavit.” ↩

66. In Ps., 64, n. 5: “Multi vocati sunt, sed pauci electi… . Itaque non res indiscreti iudicii est electio, sed ex meriti delectu facta discretio est.” ↩

67. De Fide, V, 6, 83: “Unde et Apostolus ait: quos praescivit, et praedestinavit (Rom. VIII, 29); non enim ante praedestinavit quam praescivit, sed quorum merita praescivit, eorum praemia praedestinavit.” Cfr. Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 59; Lessius, De Praedest. et Reprob., sect. 2, n. 7 sqq. ↩

68. De Gratia, II, 11. ↩

69. Cfr. O. Rottmanner, O. S. B., Der Augustinismus, München 1892; O. Pfülf, S. J., “Zur Prädestinationslehre des hl. Augustinus” in the Innsbruck Zeitschrift für kath. Theologie, 1893, pp. 483 sqq. ↩

70. V. supra, pp. 200 sqq., 216 sqq. ↩

71. Cfr. Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 64. ↩

72. Comment. in IV Libros Sent., 1, dist. 41: “Eligatur [ea sententia] quae magis placet, dum tamen salvetur libertas divina sine aliqua iniustitia et alia quae salvanda sunt circa Deum.” ↩

73. Many Scholastic utterances bearing on this subject have been collected by Lessius, De Praedest. et Reprob., sect. 2, n. 7 (Opusc. II, pp. 208 sqq., Paris 1878). ↩

74. Comment. in Quatuor Libros Sent., 1, dist. 41, qu. 1. ↩

75. Comment. in Quatuor Libros Sent., 1, dist. 41, art. 2. ↩

76. S. Theol., 1a, qu. 23, disp. 3, art. 4. ↩

77. In his treatise De Praedestinatione, dedicated to the Council of Trent. ↩

78. De Deo, disp. 9, art. 3. ↩

79. De Praedest. et Reprob., Paris edition of the Opuscula, 1878, p. 412: ”… privilegia eius omnem modum superant et ad nullum alium sunt extendenda.” ↩